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Whose Right is it Anyway?
Adjudicating Charter Rights
in the Context of Multiple
Rights Holders
Ryan Liss*

I. INTRODUCTION
Many of the rights and freedoms prescribed in the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms (Charter) protect aspects of life that rights holders
engage in collaboratively, rather than in isolation. Our protection from
unreasonable search and seizure extends to houses that we may inhabit
with family members or roommates.1 Our freedom of expression and
religion prohibits state censorship of novels co-written by multiple authors
and prohibits restriction on religious rites practised as a community.2 Our
freedom of association guarantees the rights of multiple members of a
union to collectively bargain together.3 Our right to a speedy trial applies to
the trial of multiple co-accused just as it does to the trial of an individual.4
Yet, while protecting collaborative aspects of life, the protections of the
*

Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, Western University. J.S.D. (Yale); LL.M. (Yale);
J.D. (Toronto); Hons. B.A. (Toronto). My thanks to Ben Berger, Kate Berger, Faisal Bhabha, Emma
Cunliffe, Lisa Kerr, Mabel Lai, Joanna Langille, Sonia Lawrence, Margaret Martin, David
Sandomierski, Anthony Sangiuliano, Zoë Sinel, François Tanguay-Renaud, Emily Kidd White and
the participants in the 2019 Osgoode Constitutional Cases Conference and the Western Law Faculty
Workshop for helpful comments and discussions. Thanks are also due to the anonymous peer
reviewer for their helpful and generous feedback. Finally, my thanks to Alan Yuen and Tammy Chu
for their helpful research assistance.
1
R. v. Reeves, [2018] S.C.J. No. 56, 2018 SCC 56 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Reeves”], citing
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to
the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
2
Cf Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] S.C.J. No. 46, 2004 SCC 47 (S.C.C.).
3
See, e.g., Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. British
Columbia, [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, 2007 SCC 27 (S.C.C.). But see Brian Langille, “The Freedom of
Association Mess: How We Got into It and How We Can Get out of It” (2009) 54 McGill L.J. 177-212
(discussing the Supreme Court’s confusion on whether freedom of association is a right we each possess).
4
See, e.g., R. v. Gopie, [2017] O.J. No. 4963, 2017 ONCA 728 (Ont. C.A.).
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Charter apply to each of us, individually. As a result, it is inevitable in
these contexts — where multiple rights holders possess claims “equal to
and overlapping with” one another5 — that conflicts will arise.
This seems, at least at first glance, to be precisely what occurred in
the case of R. v. Reeves.6 At issue in Reeves was the accused’s right to be
free from unreasonable search and seizure under section 8 of the
Charter.7 However, the target of the state’s search and the state’s seizure
were places occupied and objects used by Reeves together with another
— specifically, with Reeves’s common law spouse. The two parties had
different perspectives on how they preferred to exercise the section 8
rights protecting them against state intervention into their home and
against state seizure of a computer they owned and used together.
Reeves’s spouse chose to waive her section 8 rights that would otherwise
insulate that place and that object from the State’s intervention: she
consented to the State’s entrance into the home and the State’s seizure of
the computer. This led the State to evidence of crimes perpetrated by
Reeves. However, Reeves later asserted, he had never waived his section
8 protection to that same place and object. Thus, he argued, the State’s
conduct violated his section 8 rights, and the evidence collected should
be excluded at trial.
In this article, I consider how courts should approach contexts of
equal and overlapping rights claims under the Charter, using Reeves as a
case study. While such claims might initially appear novel, they seem
more familiar when we recast them not as “overlapping” rights claims
(as the Crown described them in Reeves) but rather as competing rights
claims. As I will argue, this reframing directs us to our ordinary tool for
balancing Charter claims against other competing constitutional values
including “public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental
rights and freedoms of others” — namely, proportionality.8
In making this argument, this article will proceed in four parts. In Part II,
I describe the challenge of overlapping rights posed by Reeves. The
majority concluded that Reeves’s protection against seizure of the
5

See R. v. Reeves, [2018] S.C.J. No. 56, 2018 SCC 56, at para. 18 (S.C.C.) (recounting the
Crown’s description of such context).
6
As I discuss below, there may be a further nuance to how we understand what precisely is
being balanced in the case that is not captured by the idea of overlapping rights alone. See note 80,
and accompanying text.
7
R. v. Reeves, [2018] S.C.J. No. 56, 2018 SCC 56 (S.C.C.).
8
R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd, [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 337 (S.C.C.)
(emphasis added). See also, R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at 136 (S.C.C.);
R. v. N.S., [2012] S.C.J. No. 72, 2012 SCC 72 (S.C.C.).
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computer persisted even though his spouse consented to the State’s
conduct (by waiving her own section 8 rights in the shared computer).
Though she may have sought to waive her right, the majority observed,
“... [w]aiver by one rights holder does not constitute waiver for all rights
holders.”9 Thus Reeves’s own section 8 protection endured. Finding that
the seizure of the computer amounted to a violation of Reeves’s rights
and justified the exclusion of the evidence, the majority determined it
was unnecessary to decide what they identified as the more difficult
question before them of whether one cohabitant can consent to entry by
the State (by waiving her own section 8 right to exclude the State) into a
shared home without the consent of the other co-habitants.
Yet in her concurring opinion, Côté J. argued that we should not avoid
the difficult question of whether one resident can consent to the State’s
entry into a shared home. Indeed, for Côté J., the example of the shared
home put the challenge of adjudicating overlapping rights front and
centre. If Reeves’s spouse cannot invite the State into her home, she
stressed, does this not undermine her own right to privacy? Where one
rights holder cannot exercise her own right in the manner she seeks to
simply because doing so would infringe upon another rights holder’s
protection, this would seem to deny her ability to exercise her own right.
And if the State were not permitted to enter the house when Reeves’s
spouse sought to waive her section 8 protection in the space, this “would,
in essence, subjugate her rights to his.”10
Justice Côté’s concurrence raises the question of why we cannot
simply resolve the issue of overlapping rights claims by allowing one
rights holder to waive the right of another. The majority rejected this
possibility, but the explanation the majority provides for why this would
be problematic is wanting. And, if Reeves’s spouse could waive Reeves’s
section 8 protection in the home, this would obviate the challenge raised
by Reeves in a simple and straightforward way.
In Part III, I turn to the question of why we cannot waive the rights of
another. I argue that to understand why it would be so problematic to
allow one party to waive the rights of another, we need to consider the
relationship between state authority and constitutional rights. The best
account of what justifies the robust public authority of the state,
especially in the context of criminal law, is that such authority is
necessary to secure the equal autonomy and dignity of all members of
9
10

R. v. Reeves, [2018] S.C.J. No. 56, 2018 SCC 56, at para. 52 (S.C.C.).
Id., at para. 127 (Côté J., concurring).
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society under the law. The authority of the state is necessary to secure
autonomy on a horizontal basis — that is, between each member of the
community; such authority is intended to ensure one private person
cannot decide how to treat another at will. However, creating such robust
authority brings a danger that the public authority — backed by coercive
power — will act to violate the autonomy and dignity of its citizens. This
is where constitutional rights come in, to secure the autonomy and
dignity of the individual on a vertical basis, from overreach of state
power. This structure demonstrates why permitting one person to waive
the constitutional rights of another would be so problematic: it would
undermine the very purpose of state authority, by allowing one person to
determine what can be done with the person, property, or information of
another.
However, this cannot be the end of the story. As Côté J. suggested, in the
context of overlapping rights, if we cannot consent to a waiver of a right on
behalf of another, this would seem to prevent us from acting upon our own
rights in a meaningful way.11 In Part IV, I suggest that despite seeming to
complicate the problem, the account of state authority I have described
actually offers a possible resolution to the conflict of overlapping rights. We
should not see these rights claims as overlapping, but rather as distinct
conflicting claims. And for those embracing the model of state authority I
have described, there is “a mechanism through which we can ensure any
resolution of that conflict is justifiable in terms of that same account of
legitimate state action” — proportionality reasoning.12
With this analysis in hand, in Part V, I return to the Court’s decision in
Reeves. Viewing overlapping rights claims as competing claims suggests
that the best way to resolve them is through a proportionality assessment.
The section 8 rights of Reeves’s spouse should not constrain Reeves’s
own right, but they may justify recognizing a limitation on his right.
I also argue in Part V that while the Crown, the majority, and Côté J.
portrayed the case as one concerning an overlapping rights claim, there
might be a different way to view the case suggested by Moldaver J.’s
concurring opinion. Justice Moldaver does not challenge directly the
reading of the case that the others offer; however, implicit in his decision
is the view that while Reeves does indeed involve a conflict of rights, it is
11
On the ways in which waiver of a right may or may not represent an exercise of that
right, see note 63 and accompanying text.
12
See Malcolm Thorburn, “Proportionality” in David Dyzenhaus & Malcolm Thorburn,
eds., Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) 306,
at 321-22.
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a conflict of a different sort. Nevertheless, while he offers a different
characterization of the issue, his analysis demonstrates that the solution
ought to be the same: in cases of conflicting rights, the best resolution is
through proportionality.
Finally, in my concluding section, I offer some observations as to how
the approach proposed in the article might be relevant for overlapping
rights claims outside of the context of section 8.

II. REEVES AND THE CHALLENGE OF OVERLAPPING RIGHTS
On October 22, 2012, a police officer arrived at the home Thomas
Reeves shared with his common law spouse, Nicole Gravelle. Earlier in
the day, Gravelle had reported to Reeves’s probation officer that she
believed she had found evidence of criminal activity on the home
computer they shared. At the time, Reeves was in police custody on
unrelated charges. Gravelle agreed to let the police officer enter the home
and signed a consent form allowing him to take the computer. Reeves was
later charged on the basis of the evidence found on the computer.13 Prior to
the trial, Reeves brought an application challenging the police entrance
into the home and seizure of the computer as violations of his section 8
rights, and sought to have the evidence excluded under section 24(2).14 By
the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the principal legal issues
concerned whether and how Gravelle’s consent to the police’s entry and
seizure of the computer affected Reeves’s Charter rights.
1. The Question Posed by Reeves
Section 8 of the Charter, on which Reeves relied, protects the right of
everyone “to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure.”15
13
R. v. Reeves, [2018] S.C.J. No. 56, 2018 SCC 56, at paras. 6-7 (S.C.C.); R. v. Reeves,
[2015] O.J. No. 6750, 2015 ONCJ 724, at paras. 1-13 (Ont. C.J.). Reeves was charged with
possession of and accessing child pornography.
14
Before the lower courts, Reeves also argued that the police detention of the computer
without complying with ss. 489.1 and 490 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, and errors in
the information to obtain a search warrant under which the eventual search of the computer was
carried out were violations of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of
the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. The
Application Judge and Court of Appeal both found in Reeves’s favour on these issues, and the
Crown conceded these points when the case reached the Supreme Court. See R. v. Reeves, [2018]
S.C.J. No. 56, 2018 SCC 56, at paras. 9, 10, 15 (S.C.C.).
15
Charter, id., s. 8 (emphasis added).
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Applying section 8 requires asking two core questions, one defining the
scope of the protected privacy right secured by section 8, and the other
defining when state infringement of that right might be justified.16 First,
did the accused have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the subject
matter of the search or seizure? This question serves as the threshold for
engaging constitutional protection; in contexts where an accused does
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, police conduct will not
count as a “search or seizure” for the purposes of section 8 and thus will
not be restricted in any way by the provision.17 Second, if the accused
does have a privacy right in the affected subject matter, was the state
conduct nonetheless reasonable? That is, accepting that the action was a
search or seizure, was it a reasonable one? As the Court concluded in
Collins, a search or seizure will be found to be reasonable “if it is
authorized by law [such as under a warrant], if the law itself is
reasonable and if the manner in which the search [or seizure] was carried
out is reasonable.”18
However, where an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the subject matter of the search that would ordinarily give rise to a
restriction on state conduct concerning that subject matter, it is always
open to her to consent to the state conduct at issue. Doing so — if the
consent is freely given and informed — amounts to a waiver of section 8’s
protection.19 In such contexts, the state conduct will not constitute a
search or seizure and thus need not be reasonable.
16
Overall, this assessment considers “whether in a particular situation the public’s interest
in being left alone by government must give way to the government’s interest in intruding on the
individual’s privacy in order to advance its goals, notably those of law enforcement.” Hunter v.
Southam Inc., (sub nom. Canada (Combines Investigation Acts, Director of Investigation and
Research) v. Southam Inc.) [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 159-60 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Hunter”]. Referring to the threshold stage as defining a privacy “right” could be
debated, as s. 8 does not protect a right to privacy but only a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Thus, the threshold stage could be described as assessing a privacy “entitlement” or “interest”.
However, the Court has at times described this as assessing a privacy “right” and I follow them in
doing so. See, e.g., R. v. Reeves, [2018] S.C.J. No. 56, 2018 SCC 56, at para. 31 and elsewhere
(S.C.C.); R. v. Dyment, [1988] S.C.J. No. 82, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417, at 435-36 (S.C.C.) (La Forest J.,
concurring) (shifting between reference to right to privacy and privacy interest); R. v. Edwards,
[1996] S.C.J. No. 11, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128, at para. 33 (S.C.C.).
17
See, e.g., R. v. Patrick, [2009] S.C.J. No. 17, 2009 SCC 17 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Patrick”]. See also, Hamish Stewart, “The Normative Foundations for Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy” (2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d) 335-355, at 335-336 (discussing the significance of this
threshold).
18
R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, at 278 (S.C.C.).
19
R. v. Borden, [1994] S.C.J. No. 82, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 145, at 160-62 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Borden”]; R. v. Wills, [1992] O.J. No. 294, 7 O.R. (3d) 337 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Wills”].
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This is where the challenge posed by Reeves arises. The nub of the
argument between the Crown and the defence concerned the effect that
one rights holder’s consent to state conduct has on a privacy right they
both possessed — on “a privacy interest in [a] place that is equal to and
overlapping with the privacy interests of the other co-residents.”20
The issue in Reeves was not entirely one of first impression. The
Supreme Court had previously held in Cole that a third party could not
waive the Charter rights (and section 8 rights in particular) possessed by
another person.21 Nevertheless, the Crown argued in Reeves, that where
the consenting party has an overlapping and equal claim to the privacy
interest at issue, the situation is fundamentally different: such individuals
should not be thought of as third parties under the framework developed
in Cole. In the Crown’s view it would “not be reasonable for one cohabitant to expect that his or her right to exclude others will trump
another co-habitant’s right to admit others.”22 Indeed, anything short of
recognizing that Gravelle’s rights had displaced Reeves’s claim under
section 8 “grants insufficient protection to her privacy rights.”23
Writing for the majority, Karakatsanis J. disagreed. She concluded, at
least with respect to the computer, that Reeves’s reasonable expectation
of privacy persisted despite Gravelle’s waiver. And once his privacy
rights were engaged by his reasonable expectation of privacy, Gravelle
could not waive them on his behalf. Justice Karakatsanis opted, however,
to leave the issue of a resident’s invitation of the state into a shared home
for another day. Justice Côté concurred in the result, concluding that
Reeves’s constitutional rights had been violated by conduct that was not
at issue by the time the case reached the Supreme Court. However, she
disagreed with the majority on the issues before the Court, holding that
based on Gravelle’s waiver Reeves no longer had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in either the computer or the home. And finally,
Moldaver J. offered a concurring opinion, in which he agreed with the
majority’s approach to the computer, yet concluded that the issue of the
shared home should be canvassed. As I discuss in Part V below, he
believed that Reeves may have had a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the home, but that the police entry in this context would be a
justifiable infringement of that right.
20
21
22
23

R. v. Reeves, [2018] S.C.J. No. 56, 2018 SCC 56, at para. 18 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Cole, [2012] S.C.J. No. 53, 2012 SCC 53 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cole”].
R. v. Reeves, [2018] S.C.J. No. 56, 2018 SCC 56, at para. 18 (S.C.C.).
Id., at para. 45 (emphasis in the original).
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2. Reeves’s Rights
Writing for the majority, Karakatsanis J. stressed the stakes raised by
the case; the issue had the potential to affect the privacy interests of all
individuals across the country living with others in a home or sharing a
computer.24 In light of the case’s potential implications, she sought to
resolve the issue before her as narrowly as possible: finding that the
seizure of the computer breached Reeves’s rights under section 8 and
justified exclusion of the evidence, she left the question of the state’s
invitation into a shared home for another day.25
Justice Karakatsanis observed that there were two ways to interpret
the Crown’s claim that, because Gravelle had “an equal and overlapping
privacy interest in the computer, its removal with her consent did not
constitute a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Charter.”26 First, this
could mean that Reeves no longer had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the computer in light of Gravelle’s consent.27 On this logic,
there was no violation of section 8 when the State took the computer,
because Reeves no longer had a privacy right in it and thus he was
outside the ambit of section 8’s protection.
However, Karakatsanis J. determined, this line of argument was
inconsistent with the Court’s long-standing insistence that reasonable
24
Id., at paras. 2, 23-26. See also Id., , at para. 74 (Moldaver J., concurring) (noting the
issue of consent entry to a joint home “has the potential to affect a large swath of Canadian society
by shifting our understanding of the right to be free from unreasonable search or seizure.”).
25
Id., at paras. 20, 22-23, 26. Indeed, by the time of oral argument, Reeves had conceded
that the entry into the joint home did not violate his s. 8 rights. Id., at para. 16. However, his
argument did not concern the question of whether Reeves had a reasonable expectation of privacy or
whether Gravelle could consent to a waive of Reeves’s rights. Rather, counsel for Reeves suggested
that the police entry to interview Gravelle may not have been a “search” under s. 8. See Id., at para. 72
(Moldaver J., concurring). However, as Moldaver J., indicates in his concurring opinion, this
suggestion is inconsistent with the s. 8 jurisprudence which interprets search as “any state action that
intrudes upon a reasonable expectation of privacy.” Id., at para. 72, citing, inter alia, R. v. Evans,
[1996] S.C.J. No. 1, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 8, at para. 11 (S.C.C.).
26
Reeves, id., at para. 40. Justice Karakatsanis also addressed and dismissed the argument
that the mere fact of sharing the computer with others meant that Reeves lacked a reasonable
expectation of privacy in it. While control and ownership are relevant in assessing our reasonable
expectations of privacy, they are not determinative; thus, the mere fact of joint ownership and use of
a computer may diminish an expectation of privacy, it cannot extinguish it. Id., at para. 36. As has
been accepted by the Court cases such as Vu and Morelli, we possess heighted privacy interests in
the data contained in personal computers we use: R. v. Vu, [2013] S.C.J. No. 60, 2013 SCC 60
(S.C.C.); R. v. Morelli, [2010] S.C.J. No. 8, 2010 SCC 8 (S.C.C.). Justice Karakatsanis also
concluded that even in the context of a seizure of a computer (rather than a seizure) informational
privacy is engaged as it was seized for the purpose of retaining the data for the very purposes of a
future search. Reeves, id., at paras. 30-35.
27
Reeves, id., at para. 40.
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expectation of privacy is a normative concept rather than a descriptive
concept.28 The mere fact that a co-user has access to the information
contained on a shared computer and could share that information with
the state, does not mean that we should accept that the other users no
longer have a reasonable expectation of privacy in that computer vis-à-vis
the state. Indeed, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected this sort of
risk-based approach to assessing what expectations of privacy are
reasonable in Duarte, breaking with the approach to the issue followed in
the United States.29
It was not reasonable to suggest, Karakatsanis J. determined, that “by
choosing to share our computer with friends and family, we are required
to give up our Charter protection from state interference with our private
lives.”30 Thus, she concluded,
... We are not required to accept that our friends and family can
unilaterally authorize the police to take things that we share. The
decision to share with others does not come at such a high a price in a
free and democratic society.31

Moreover, while the privacy rights of one co-rights holder (including
her right to both shield and expose her own domains of privacy) may
“attenuate a reasonable expectation of privacy [of other rights holders]
… they cannot eliminate it.”32 Thus, Reeves’s reasonable expectation of
privacy in the computer, while perhaps diminished by Gravelle’s consent,
nonetheless remained. And a diminished and attenuated reasonable
expectation of privacy is still one that receives section 8 protection and
requires a justification for state infringement.33

28

Id., at paras. 41-42.
Id., at para. 42. See R. v. Duarte, [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.). See
also, Hamish Stewart, “The Normative Foundations for Reasonable Expectations of Privacy” (2011),
54 S.C.L.R. (2d) 335-355, at 335-36 (noting that despite this clear statement in Duarte, the Court has
in effect engaged in risk analysis in its assessment of reasonable expectation of privacy
subsequently; Lisa M. Austin, “Information Sharing and ‘Reasonable’ Ambiguities of Section 8 of
the Charter”, (Special Issue, Spring 2007) 57 Univ. of Toronto L.J. 499, at 510 (making a similar
point and describing the Court’s approach as an “what did you expect” approach to the assessment,
which “tends to lapse into a descriptive rather than normative analysis”).
30
Reeves, id., at para. 44.
31
Id.
32
Id.at para. 45.
33
Id., at para. 47. See also, R. v. Cole, [2012] S.C.J. No. 53, 2012 SCC 53, at paras. 9, 58
(S.C.C.) (noting that a diminished expectation of privacy is still protected under s. 8); R. v. Buhay,
[2003] S.C.J. No. 30, 2003 SCC 30 (S.C.C.) (same); R. v. M.R.M., [1998] S.C.J. No. 83, [1998] 3
S.C.R. 393 (S.C.C.) (same).
29
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The second way one could interpret the Crown’s claim that Gravelle’s
consent rendered the conduct Charter compliant, Karakatsanis J.
observed, was that — while Reeves may have retained a reasonable
expectation of privacy — Gravelle had waived any section 8 protection
on Reeves’s behalf.34 Where the first interpretation asked whether Reeves
had a right in the first place in light of Gravelle’s conduct, this second
interpretation accepted that he did have a right but asserted that Gravelle
had waived it. This too, Karakatsanis J. concluded, was unconvincing.
The Court had concluded in Cole that a third party (in that case the
accused’s employer, who owned the computer at issue but did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in it) could not waive the section 8
rights of the accused.35 And the Crown’s claim that the case could be
distinguished from Cole did not hold up. From Reeves’s perspective,
Gravelle was no different than the third party in Cole:
... While Gravelle undoubtedly has constitutionally-protected privacy
interests in the shared computer, this does not entitle her to relinquish
Reeves’ constitutional right to be left alone …. Waiver by one rights
holder does not constitute waiver for all rights holders.36

After all, allowing one rights holder to waive the right of another
would be inconsistent with the Court’s earlier insistence that one’s
consent to waive her own Charter right is only operative when informed
and voluntary, to ensure the waiver is “an expression of [the rights
holder’s] free will.”37 If the waiver could come from Person B —
whether Person B’s own privacy right was at issue or not — it could not
represent the expression of Person A’s free will.
Justice Karakatsanis’s first premise that we have a persisting
reasonable expectation of privacy in shared subject matter
notwithstanding the conduct of others who have a privacy right in that
same subject matter is interesting and consequential in itself, and it is
worthy of further comment. However, in this article, my focus is on the
34

Reeves, id., at para. 40.
R. v. Cole, [2012] S.C.J. No. 53, 2012 SCC 53, at paras. 74-79 (S.C.C.). The principle of
third party consent had been accepted in the United States — including for co-rights holders — but
this was based on a risk-based approach to assessing the reasonable expectation of privacy. Id., at
paras. 75-76. See also, United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S.
177 (1990). Accepting this approach here, would also be inconsistent with the Court’s rejection of
the risk-based approach to s. 8 in R. v. Duarte, [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30 (S.C.C.).
Cole, id., at para. 75. See also R. v. Reeves, [2018] S.C.J. No. 56, 2018 SCC 56, at para. 50 (S.C.C.).
36
Reeves, id., at para. 52.
37
Id., at para. 52.
35
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second premise: that we cannot waive the rights we share, a premise
which could have significant implications for Charter rights beyond the
context of section 8.
3. The Rights of Others
In the abstract, it seems self-evident that we cannot waive the Charter
rights of another person; indeed, at every level of court that heard
Reeves, the judges were unanimous on this point.38 However, while
formally accepting this premise, many of these same judges seemed
uncomfortable with the implications that followed from it. In particular,
they expressed concern for the status of Gravelle’s own constitutional
rights if she were not entitled to benefit from the waiver of them and thus
no longer allowed to fully exercise them as she saw fit. If she were
unable to consent to the State’s conduct with respect to places and things
concerning which she too possessed a right to privacy, then she could not
act upon her protected rights in the manner she sought to. As Côté J.
stressed in her concurring opinion, the majority’s approach “would, in
essence, subjugate her rights to his.”39
This concern was elevated, Côté J. observed, in the context of the
entry to the shared home. A resident must be able to consent to the entry
of third parties including the police, and “... [t]o hold otherwise would be
to interfere with the consenting cohabitant’s liberty and autonomy
interests with respect to those spaces.”40 On this basis, Côté J. concluded
that Gravelle’s exercise of her right displaced Reeves’s constitutional
protection;41 Reeves’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the home
38
Id., at para. 112 (Côté J., concurring); R. v. Reeves, [2017] O.J. No. 3038, 2017 ONCA
365, at para. 46 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Reeves, [2015] O.J. No. 6750, 2015 ONCJ 724, at paras. 19-20
(Ont. C.J.).
39
Reeves, id., at para. 127 (Côté J., concurring).
40
Id., at para. 112 (Côté J., concurring). Justice Côté concluded on this basis that Reeves
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, as his “reasonable expectation of privacy was not
sufficiently capacious to afford constitutional protections against a cohabitant’s decision to give the
police access to common areas.” Id. She did not, however, respond directly to the majority’s
observation that this may have diminished Reeves’s reasonable expectation of privacy but could not
extinguish it.
41
As she noted, this is the same conclusion that all provincial appellate courts that
considered the issue of the constitutionality of a single resident’s consent to police entry prior to
Reeves had arrived at. Id., at para. 117 (Côté J., concurring). See R. v. Reeves, [2017] O.J. No. 3038,
2017 ONCA 365, at para. 46 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Clarke, [2017] B.C.J. No. 2647, 2017 BCCA 453
(B.C.C.A.); R. v. R.M.J.T., [2014] M.J. No. 115, 2014 MBCA 36 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Squires, [2005]
N.J. No. 253, 2005 NLCA 51 (Nfld. C.A.).
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“was not sufficiently capacious to afford constitutional protection against
a co-habitant’s decision to give the police access to common areas.”42
(Indeed, while this concern was particularly weighty in the context of the
shared home, Côté J. felt it extended to the shared computer as well.
Thus, she disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that Reeves had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the computer.43)
Even Karakatsanis J., writing for the majority, recognized the
significance of Gravelle’s rights. In deciding to leave for another day the
issue of whether the entry of the police into a shared home on the basis
of a co-habitant’s consent violated the section 8 rights of the other
residents, she stressed the importance of the rights of the consenting
co-habitant. As she observed, “if a resident cannot consent to police entry
to a shared home without the consent of all the other residents, it could
undermine the dignity and autonomy of that resident – especially for a
victim of crime.”44
And yet, it is not immediately clear that Karakatsanis J.’s explanation
regarding Reeves’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the shared
computer (i.e., that it persisted despite Gravelle’s waiver) would not
apply with equal measure to the home.45 While the Court has recognized
that we possess a heightened informational expectation of privacy in our
computers because of the intimate information they reveal,46 the Court
42

Reeves, id., at para. 112 (Côté J., concurring). In addition to Côté J.’s primary concern
with Gravelle’s own right and autonomy, she also concluded that Reeves could not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy here because it would “substantially undermine effective law
enforcement.”: Id., at para. 114 (Côté J., concurring). On this approach to analyzing the threshold
privacy entitlement, see Lisa M. Austin, “Information Sharing and ‘Reasonable’ Ambiguities of
Section 8 of the Charter” (Special Issue, Spring 2007) 57 Univ. of Toronto L.J. 499, at 510:
Because the language of ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ is used to both describe the
balancing exercise outlined in Hunter, as well as to determine the threshold question of
whether something is a search or seizure, the courts often conflate these two distinct
inquiries. When conflated, factors that relate to the state or societal interest in getting
access to information can discount the privacy interest at stake.
43
Reeves, id., at para. 127 (Côté J., concurring).
44
Id., at para. 24. Notably, while framing this concern in the tenor of privacy rights, what
ultimately seems to be behind this concern for Karakatsanis J. is the need to secure the protection of
the victim co-habitant’s autonomy and dignity on a horizontal basis from the accused. See note 80
and accompanying text.
45
As with the computer, consent by one resident may diminish a co-resident’s reasonable
expectation of privacy in the home, but it would seem surprising to say it extinguishes it all together.
On the ways in which entrance into the home might be justified on this basis, however, see Part V.
46
See R. v. Vu, [2013] S.C.J. No. 60, 2013 SCC 60 (S.C.C.); R. v. Morelli, [2010] S.C.J.
No. 8, 2010 SCC 8 (S.C.C.). However, as Côté observed, what was at issue in this case was seizure
of the computer as opposed to a search of it. R. v. Reeves, [2018] S.C.J. No. 56, 2018 SCC 56, at
paras. 123-125 (S.C.C.) (Côté J., concurring).
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has also long recognized that we possess an elevated territorial
expectation of privacy in the home.47 As the Court observed in Silveira,
“[t]here is no place on earth where persons can have a greater
expectation of privacy than within their ‘dwelling-house’.”48 Indeed, the
very origin of section 8 derives from the common law’s protection of
the home against physical entry by the state.49 Thus it would seem, for
the same reasons that Reeves’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the
computer persisted despite Gravelle’s waiver, his reasonable expectation
of privacy in the home should likewise endure.
On this basis, Reeves’s section 8 rights should prohibit the entry of
the police into the home, unless he consented to their entry or the entry
was justified as a reasonable search. And as Karakatsanis J. observed in
the context of the computer, it would seem that Gravelle’s consent to the
police entry would not be the relevant consent; as she stressed, “[w]aiver
by one rights holder does not constitute waiver for all rights holders.”50
Thus, while she refrained from analyzing the issue, it is unclear how
Karakatsanis J. could approach the question of entry into the shared
home in a different manner. And on this analysis, Gravelle’s right to
privacy and her “dignity and autonomy”, with which Karakatsanis J. (and
Côté J.) were concerned seem to fade into the background.
The challenge stressed by Côté J., and noted by Karakatsanis J.,
requires thinking about why we cannot waive the Charter rights of
another. Despite the consensus among the judges that we cannot waive
the rights of others, their analysis does not offer a thorough explanation
or justification. The majority suggested that this premise follows from
the fact that the case law requires that a primary rights holder’s own
47
See, e.g., R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, 2004 SCC 67, at para. 140 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Tessling”]; R. v. Evans, [1996] S.C.J. No. 1, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 8, at para. 42 (S.C.C.); R.
v. Gomboc, [2010] S.C.J. No. 55, 2010 SCC 55, at para. 45 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Gomboc”]. This is
a point that Karakatsanis J. acknowledges: Reeves, id., at para. 24.
48
R. v. Silveira, [1995] S.C.J. No. 38, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 297, at para. 140 (S.C.C.).
49
See Semanye’s Case (1604), 77 E.R. 194 (U.K. K.B.); Entick v. Carrington (1765), 95
E.R. 807 (U.K. K.B.). See also, Hunter v. Southam Inc., (sub nom. Canada (Combines Investigation
Acts, Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc.) [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R.
145, at 157-58 (S.C.C.) (making the connection to these origins); R. v. Dyment, [1988] S.C.J. No. 82,
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 417, at 426 (S.C.C.) (La Forest J., concurring) (discussing these common law cases,
and suggesting that the contemporary protection of s. 8 should be derived by analogy to what the
original protection of the home was meant to secure). Notably unlike in the cases of Tessling,
Gomboc, and Patrick, the search at issue in Reeves involved the physical entry into the claimant’s
home: the very thing that the protection underlying s. 8 was intended to protect. See R. v. Gomboc,
[2010] S.C.J. No. 55, 2010 SCC 55, at paras. 49-50 (S.C.C.) (making this distinction).
50
R. v. Reeves, [2018] S.C.J. No. 56, 2018 SCC 56, at para. 52 (S.C.C.).
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waiver must be informed and freely given: if someone else consents then
it will not be a free and informed waiver from the claimant. However,
this analysis seems to beg the question rather than answer it.51 As a
result, we are left with the question of precisely why we cannot consent
to waive the rights of another, even when this restriction would limit the
exercise of our own rights (including, our ability to waive our Charter
rights).

III. WHY WE CANNOT WAIVE THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS
Despite agreement among the judges that one cannot waive the rights
of others, it is worth interrogating this premise further. After all,
recognizing Gravelle’s ability to waive Reeves’s Charter rights would
offer a straightforward and clear solution to how we might adjudicate
overlapping rights claims. Moreover, it would offer a solution that
addresses the concerns Côté and Karakatsanis identified with respect to
the status of Gravelle’s own rights. So why is it that we cannot simply
waive the constitutional rights of others? As I explain in this section, to
understand why it would be so problematic to permit one person to waive
the constitutional rights that protect another, we need to understand the
relationship between state authority and constitutional rights.
The best account of what justifies the robust public authority of the
state, especially in the context of criminal law,52 is that such authority is
necessary to secure the equal autonomy and dignity of all members of
society under the law.53 Specifically, the authority of the state is
51

Id. Moreover, the original discussion in Borden and Wills justifying the conditions under
which s. 8 can be waived is thin. See R. v. Borden, [1994] S.C.J. No. 82, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 145, at
160-62 (S.C.C.); R. v. Wills, [1992] O.J. No. 294, 7 O.R. (3d) 337 (Ont. C.A.).
52
On the particular challenge posed by criminal law: see Malcolm Thorburn, “Punishment
and Public Authority” in Antje Du Bois-Pedain, Magnus Ulvang & Petter Asp, eds., Criminal Law
and the Authority of the State (London: Hart, 2017) 7.
53
The principle that we should structure political relations around the premise that we must
secure our equal autonomy and dignity has centuries’ old roots, and is evident in various forms
across a wide swath of contemporary political, moral, and legal theory. See, e.g., Philip Pettit,
Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999);
T.R.S. Allan, Law, Liberty, and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); T.R.S. Allan, The Sovereignty of Law: Freedom,
Constitution and Common Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Jacob Weinrib,
Dimensions of Dignity: The Theory and Practice of Modern Constitutional Law (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2016); Anna Stilz, Liberal Loyalty: Freedom, Obligation, and the State
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s
Legal and Political Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).
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necessary to secure the autonomy and dignity between each member of
the community — what might be called horizontal autonomy. By
creating a legal order, the state establishes the “basic rules according to
which people shall organise their shared lives together in the
jurisdiction.”54 This is something we cannot do without the legal
structure provided by the state setting out, adjudicating, and enforcing
rules that apply to us all equally. We can contrast this structure of rule of
law with rule by might, where the rules regarding how we treat each
other are determined by each of us individually (such that we are subject
to domination by powerful private persons).55 The state’s ability to secure
the rule of law creates the possibility of a condition of equal autonomy
and dignity between each of us that we would lack without it.56
However, securing equality under the rule of law creates a new
problem: it entails establishing robust public authority that can also act in
a way that is inconsistent with the very autonomy and dignity of persons
it was meant to protect.57 We create a new danger that the state will
exercise its coercive power in a way that is inconsistent with its purpose
of securing our equal status under the law. This might be described as the
problem of vertical autonomy: the challenge of creating a vertical
relationship between the state and citizen that is consistent with the
autonomy and dignity of the individual. This is where constitutional
rights come in: they serve as the enforceable limits on state power that
can secure the autonomy and dignity of the individual on a vertical basis,

54
Malcolm Thorburn, “Punishment and Public Authority” [hereinafter “Thorburn”] in
Antje Du Bois-Pedain, Magnus Ulvang & Petter Asp, eds., Criminal Law and the Authority of the
State (London: Hart, 2017), 7, at 9.
55
Jacob Weinrib, Dimensions of Dignity: The Theory and Practice of Modern
Constitutional Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), at 56 (noting that without the
state, we encounter the problem of unilateral conduct and “lawlessness, in which the independence
of each is subject to the arbitrary choice of every other”); Thorburn, id., at 28-30 (distinguishing this
claim about law’s relationship to equality from claims of practical necessity of entering a state for
the purposes of coordination proposed by Locke and Hobbes); Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom:
Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009). The
primary concern here is not simply that we are, in fact, subjected to powerful private persons, but
that our rights are ultimately always at the whim of such others.
56
Malcolm Thorburn, “Proportionality” in David Dyzenhaus & Malcolm Thorburn, eds,
Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) 306, at
316. This is not to say that domination is removed by a system of law, or all legal systems in practice
demonstrate this form. However, this premise offers the best account of what might justify public
authority and the standard against which we can assess the merits of existing frameworks.
57
Jacob Weinrib, Dimensions of Dignity: The Theory and Practice of Modern
Constitutional Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), at 59 [hereinafter “Weinrib”].
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from the overreach of state power.58 In this way, securing the equal
autonomy and dignity of those within the state is both the justification for
and the limit on state authority.
And section 8 is a prime example of this conception of the limits of
state authority. As Rowe J. recently observed in his concurring opinion in
Jarvis, section 8 is fundamentally about the relationship between state
and citizen:
... Section 8 of the Charter limits the powers of the state vis-à-vis its
citizens. It limits the investigative powers of the state, and maintains a
check on the action of the police. The imbalance between the state and
its citizens is fundamental. Protecting citizens from the abuse of
authority by the state is the context that defines the interests to be
safeguarded by the s. 8 ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’.59

The purpose of the provision — securing vertical autonomy in light of
the power imbalance between state and citizen — is central to its
application.60
Likewise, as La Forest J. stressed in Dyment, the protection of section 8
is fundamentally concerned with securing the autonomy and dignity of
the individual from state overreach. This protection, he observed, is a
constituent part of a legal and political order structured around the rights
of the individual:
... Grounded in man’s physical and moral autonomy, privacy is
essential for the well-being of the individual. For this reason alone, it is
worthy of constitutional protection, but it also has profound
significance for the public order. The restraints imposed on government
to pry into the lives of the citizens go to the essence of a democratic
state.61

58

See, e.g., Weinrib, id., at 152; Malcolm Thorburn, “Proportionality” in David Dyzenhaus
& Malcolm Thorburn, eds., Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2016), 306, at 321-22.
59
R. v. Jarvis, [2019] S.C.J. No. 10, 2019 SCC 10, at para. 99 (S.C.C.) (Rowe J.,
concurring) [hereinafter “Jarvis”].
60
On this basis, Rowe J. concluded in Jarvis, the principles guiding its interpretation could
not apply with equal force when interpreting ideas of privacy on a horizontal level between persons
in the application of s. 162 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46: Jarvis, id., at paras. 95, 101
(Rowe J., concurring). While the majority disagreed with Rowe J. on whether the principles guiding
the interpretation of s. 8 are relevant in the context of s. 162. However, they did not disagree about
this fundamental purpose of s. 8. See Jarvis, id., at paras. 57-58.
61
R. v. Dyment, [1988] S.C.J. No. 82, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417, at 427-28 (S.C.C.) (La Forest J.,
concurring). See also, Lisa Austin, “Privacy and the Question of Technology” (2003) 22 Law &
Phil. 119, at 147 (discussing the relationship between privacy and the liberal conception of the self);
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Indeed, “... [t]he ultimate justification for a constitutional guarantee of
the right to privacy”, he observed in Thomson Newspapers “is our belief,
consistent with so many of our legal and political traditions, that it is for
the individual to determine the manner in which he or she will order his
or her private life.”62
Thus, when it comes to our protection under section 8 — as with
other constitutional rights — the purpose of the right is to protect an
individual from the state. While other people may have protection
concerning the same subject matter (be it privacy in the context of
section 8, a religious practice under section 2(a), or otherwise), the
relevant relationship for assessing the nature and scope of the right is a
vertical one between the state and citizen. This is precisely what
Karakatsanis J. suggested in Reeves when she observed that, with respect
to constitutional rights, anyone else (that is, anyone who is not the state
or the claimant) is a third party in the sense of Cole.
This relationship between public authority and constitutional rights
helps us see why it would be so problematic to permit one person to
waive the constitutional rights of another. Public authority is meant to
secure our autonomy and dignity from other private persons; and
constitutional rights are meant to secure our autonomy and dignity from
the resulting power of the public authority. To allow one person to waive
the rights that protect another person from the state would put us right
back where we started: having our rights and freedoms determined by the
say-so of another person. Accepting that one person can waive the
constitutional rights of another would undermine the very purpose of
state authority, by allowing one person to determine what can be done
with the person, property, or information of another.

IV. HOW DO WE DEAL WITH OVERLAPPING RIGHTS?
The above analysis offers some conceptual and normative clarity as to
why one person cannot waive another’s constitutional rights. However, if
the issue in Reeves entails adjudicating rights in a context of two
overlapping claims of a constitutional right — as the Crown,
Jeffrey H. Reiman, “Driving to the Panopticon: A Philosophical Exploration of the Risks of Privacy
Posed by the Highway Technology of the Future” (2012) 11 Santa Clara High Tech L.J. 27, at 42
(same).
62
Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research,
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission), [1990] S.C.J. No. 23, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425, at 517
(S.C.C.).
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Karakatsanis, and Côté suggest it does — the discussion in Part III
ultimately seems unsatisfying. (I suggest in Part V that perhaps the
Crown, Karakatsanis, and Côté’s approach is not the best way to
understand what is at issue in Reeves; however, for the moment I
consider how we might address the issue as they have framed it.) In the
context of overlapping constitutional rights, such as those held by Reeves
and Gravelle, it would seem (and Côté stresses) that the fact that we
cannot waive the rights of another person prevents us from acting on our
own rights as we see fit.63 And while the prohibition of waiving someone
else’s right might be justified by the need to secure the autonomy and
dignity of the protected rights holder, as Karakatsanis and Côté JJ.
suggest, Gravelle’s inability to effectively waive her own right to privacy
likewise seems to undermine her autonomy and dignity.64 The theory of
state authority I discussed above explains why we cannot rely on one’s
ability to waive the rights of another to solve this problem. However, as I
discuss in this section, this same account of state authority also points to
an alternative means of resolving the challenge of adjudicating claims of
overlapping rights: through the framework of proportionality. Moreover,

63
I assume for the moment that this is the case, as such a premise seems to underpin the
positions of the Crown, Karakatsanis, and Côté JJ. To the extent that I accept that waiver of a right
might be viewed as an exercise of that right, I am not claiming that possessing a right necessarily
entails the ability to waive it. In other words, the statement that the ability to waive one’s right might
be an exercise of that right is not a claim that every right must be waivable (and thus that no rights
are inalienable). Thus, my argument does not subscribe to a will theory of rights, which are often
critiqued for their inability to recognize that certain rights (such as the right not to be enslaved) are
inalienable. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political
Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), at 183 (delineating a will theory of rights, describing a
rights holder as a “small scale sovereign” with respect to the right at issue); D.N. MacCormick,
“Rights in Legislation” in PMS Hacker & Joseph Raz, eds., Law, Morality and Society: Essays in
Honour of HLA Hart (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977) 189, at 197 (noting the inability of
will theorists to account for inalienable rights). Instead, I am simply suggesting that for those rights
(such as the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure), which we have recognized are
waivable, the decision to waive a right might plausibly be viewed as a form of exercising that right.
See note 19 and accompanying text (discussing the recognition of the ability to waive s. 8 of the
Charter). Nevertheless, I discuss further below precisely what we should view to be the
consequences of one’s waiver of a constitutional right (i.e., whether it necessitates that the state be
able to act upon that waiver or not). See note 79 and accompanying text.
64
R. v. Reeves, [2018] S.C.J. No. 56, 2018 SCC 56, at para. 24 (S.C.C.) (noting that not
recognizing the constitutionality of police entrance on the invitation of one resident would
“undermine the dignity and autonomy of that resident – especially for a victim of crime”); Id., at
para. 112 (Côté J., concurring) (noting, that we must allow a co-habitant’s consent to negate the
reasonable expectation of privacy of other residents, and that “... [t]o hold otherwise would be to
interfere with the consenting cohabitant’s liberty and autonomy interests with respect to those
spaces”).
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as I will argue, this is the same solution that the Charter itself would
suggest.
The Crown in Reeves described Reeves’s and Gravelle’s privacy
rights as “equal to and overlapping with” one another, suggesting a
collective entitlement in a single subject matter.65 However, as the
analysis above demonstrates, the rights at stake in Reeves were in fact of
a different normative structure. Instead of a collective entitlement,
Reeves and Gravelle each held discrete rights in the same subject matter.
And, at least as understood by Côté J., these rights should be considered
competing, because the fulfilment of one seems to challenge the
fulfilment of the other.
In contemplating how to resolve this conflict, it is worth returning to
the idea of state authority discussed in Part III. Where the aim of
securing our equal autonomy and dignity under the law is both the
justification for and limit on state authority, there must be a means of
addressing instances of conflict where securing the autonomy and dignity
of one person is inconsistent with securing that of another.66 And scholars
such as Malcolm Thorburn and Jacob Weinrib have demonstrated that
proportionality fulfils this role.67 Proportionality, Thorburn, argues offers
“a mechanism through which we can ensure any resolution of … conflict
[caused by the demands of such an account of state authority] is
justifiable in terms of that same account of legitimate state action.”68
Proportionality allows us to consider whether a limitation of a right is
based on a pressing and substantial objective — such as “public safety,
order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of
others”69 — that are themselves required to secure respect for equal
autonomy and dignity under the law.70 It allows us to assess whether the
proposed limitation on the right is rationally connected to that objective,
and is minimally impairing — in other words, to assess whether there is
65

Id., at para. 18.
Malcolm Thorburn, “Proportionality” [hereinafter “Thorburn, ‘Proportionality’”] in
David Dyzenhaus & Malcolm Thorburn, eds., Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 306, at 321-22.
67
Thorburn, “Proportionality, id.; Jacob Weinrib, Dimensions of Dignity: The Theory and
Practice of Modern Constitutional Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), at ch. 7.
68
See Thorburn, “Proportionality”, id.
69
R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 337 (S.C.C.)
(emphasis added). See also, R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at 136 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Oakes”]. This admittedly requires a narrower scope of pressing and substantial
objectives currently recognized in Canadian law.
70
Jacob Weinrib, Dimensions of Dignity: The Theory and Practice of Modern
Constitutional Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), at 222-23.
66
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an “actuality” of a conflict caused by the aims of the framework of state
authority.71 And where a true conflict is found, an assessment of
proportionality stricto sensu should seek the outcome most consistent
with the overarching aim of state authority to respect the autonomy and
dignity under the law of all persons.72
Under this account, the justifiable limitation on rights and the rights
that are restricted by these limitations are both animated by the same
principles that underlie state authority. As described by Dickson C.J.C. in
Oakes, “... [t]he underlying values and principles of a free and
democratic society are the genesis of the rights and freedoms guaranteed
by the Charter and the ultimate standard against which a limit on a right
or freedom must be shown, despite its effect, to be reasonable and
demonstrably justified.”73 Competing constitutional rights claims are one
manifestation of this framework, where both the limit and the protected
right reflect the animating and limiting aims of state authority.
And indeed, in the face of competing rights claims — including in the
context of criminal law — the Court has turned to a framework of
proportionality in more and less formal ways. For instance, in R. v. N.S.,
when faced with the competing freedom of religion of the complainant
and the fair trial rights of the accused, McLachlin C.J.C., writing for the
majority, held that the “answer lies in a just and proportionate balance …
based on the particular case before the Court.”74 Likewise, in Mills, when
faced with balancing the privacy rights of complainants with the trial
rights of the accused, Lamer C.J.C., writing in dissent, sought to balance
these competing rights under section 1 of the Charter.75 The majority in
Mills also made an effort to balance the privacy rights of the complainant
with the rights of the accused through a framework of right and justified
limitation — though not through a formal proportionality assessment.76

71

Id., at 229.
Id.
73
R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at 136 (S.C.C.) (emphasis added).
See also Weinrib, id., at 242 (discussing this quote in this context), and id., at 229 (noting that “the
yardstick against which these quantities are set is the ideal of public justice or human dignity under
law, which, as we have seen, forms the basis of both constitutional rights and the purposes for which
they can be justifiably limited”).
74
[2012] S.C.J. No. 72, 2012 SCC 72, at para. 31 (S.C.C.).
75
R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668 (S.C.C.).
76
Id. They suggested engaging in the balancing with the principles of fundamental justice
themselves under s. 7.
72
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The Court, when seeking to balance between competing Charter rights,
has sought a proportionate balance between the two.77

V. RETURNING TO REEVES
With this analysis in hand we can return to the decision in Reeves. In
light of the discussion thus far, we can better understand the role that the
consent of a co-rights holder (such as Gravelle) should play. Justices
Côté and Karakatsanis suggested that we need to keep Gravelle’s own
privacy rights in view — as well as her “autonomy and liberty” — when
assessing Reeves’s section 8 rights. Justice Karakatsanis was wary of
addressing the issue of the state’s entry into the shared house in light of
the implications for Gravelle’s rights. Justice Côté agreed, and, in fact,
held that we should interpret the scope of Reeves’s privacy right in a way
that was responsive to Gravelle’s exercise of her own entitlement
(effectively permitting Gravelle to waive Reeves’s right). We can now
see why Côté J.’s proposed approach would be so problematic: it would
allow one person to determine the parameters of a constitutional right
held by another, and thus undermine the very purpose of state authority
and constitutional rights.78
Yet our discussion thus far also demonstrates that the rights of others
should nevertheless have some role in the adjudication of a claimant’s
constitutional rights. While the impact on the rights of others cannot
define the scope of a right that we possess, this is exactly the sort of thing
we should take into account in determining if a limitation of our right is
justified. The constitutional rights of others should not inform how we
interpret what rights we possess vis-à-vis the state; however, the rights of
others might rightfully inform when and why the state is justified in
infringing upon our rights. As I argued above, we can make this
determination through the framework of proportionality. This is the
approach to take when faced with two competing rights, and this may
77

A similar logic is at play in the Court’s analysis in Trinity Western University in the
context of administrative law: see Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University,
[2018] S.C.J. No. 32, 2018 SCC 32 (S.C.C.).
78
There is also a very different sort of concern that arises with consent searches, namely
whether they are truly consensual. See, e.g., Roseanna Sommers & Vanessa K. Bohns, “The
Voluntariness of Voluntary Consent: Consent Searches and the Psychology of Compliance”, 128:7
Yale L.J. 1962 (2019). Concerns of this sort seem to arise on the facts of Reeves as well: see R. v.
Reeves, [2018] S.C.J. No. 56, 2018 SCC 56, at para. 46 (S.C.C.). Such practical problems are
certainly important but are different in kind from those addressed in this article.
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likewise be the proper approach when faced with “overlapping” rights of
two or more claimants that manifest as competing rights such as the
circumstance in Reeves.
However, there also might be a different way of thinking through the
problem of Reeves itself. The Crown described the case as an instance of
“overlapping” privacy rights, and Côté and Karakatsanis JJ., seem to
accept this framing in their respective approaches to the case. The
discussion thus far has taken this framework as our starting point, and
has offered a suggestion of how we might approach such contexts if they
truly are instances of overlapping or competing vertical (or
constitutional) rights. However, through the analysis above, we can also
see that there seems to be another way of looking at the problem
altogether that is immanent in Moldaver J.’s concurring opinion. While
not identifying it directly in these terms, Moldaver J. seems to view the
issue raised by Reeves as not involving the relationship between Reeves’s
and Gravelle’s respective vertical autonomy (to privacy from the state),
but rather as concerning the relationship between Reeves’s vertical
autonomy from the state and Gravelle’s (and others) horizontal
autonomy from private persons. With the context of our discussion in
Part III, this distinction now becomes clear. Implicit in Moldaver J.’s
decision is the — arguably correct79 — view that despite the suggestion
of the Crown, Karakatsanis J., and Côté J., the case was perhaps not
about overlapping rights at all.80
79
I accepted above that the waiver of a right might rightly be viewed as an exercise of that
right. See note 63 and accompanying text. However, the waiver of an individual’s right to privacy
does not necessarily mean that the state must be able to intrude upon the otherwise protected zone.
Indeed, one could waive her right to privacy in a context where the state has no interest in intruding
at all. The fact that the state fails to intrude upon this otherwise protected space does not mean that
the individual has not effectively waived her right. The same could be true of a situation like Reeves,
suggesting that despite the view of the Crown, Karakatsanis J., and Côté J., the case is perhaps better
thought of, not as a context of overlapping vertical rights, but as a context of competing horizontal
and vertical rights. In short whether we view the case as best understood as balancing two vertical
rights or horizontal and vertical rights depends on how we think about the effect of a waiver of
rights. While Moldaver J.’s reading of the situation seems prima facie to be the more apt one, I leave
for another day a full defence of this position.
80
In fact — while they treat the case as involving the balance between Reeves’s and
Gravelle’s right to privacy — the premise that we should actually be concerned with the balance
between Reeves’s vertical autonomy and the horizontal autonomy of persons also seems to be in the
background behind Karakatsanis J.’s and Côté J.’s decisions. For instance, as discussed above, what
Karakatsanis J. finds particularly challenging about the constitutionality of the invitation of the
police into a joint home are the implications for autonomy of victims of crime if they cannot invite
the police into the home. See R. v. Reeves, [2018] S.C.J. No. 56, 2018 SCC 56, at para. 24 (S.C.C.);
see also id., at para. 112 (Côté J., concurring). Unless we are concerned with securing the horizontal
autonomy of persons from others, it is not clear why being a victim of crime would be relevant to
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Justice Moldaver agreed with the majority that Reeves retained his
reasonable expectation of privacy in the shared computer and that its
seizure represented a violation of section 8. However, Moldaver J.
worried about the majority’s choice to refrain from commenting on the
question of whether one resident can invite the police into a shared
house. The determination of whether or not the police entrance upon
such an invitation violated the section 8 rights of the other nonconsenting residents was of such importance for Canadian law, and
Canadian society, Moldaver J. indicated, that he felt compelled to
“express some tentative views” on the matter.81
Unlike Côté J., he did not think we should approach the issue by
concluding that Reeves no longer had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the home after Gravelle consented. Rather, Moldaver J.
accepted (at least for the sake of his “tentative views”) that Reeves
retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home — even after
Gravelle’s waiver of her right — and thus Reeves retained a protected
privacy right. Nevertheless, Moldaver J. suggested that the State’s
entrance into the joint home might be lawful as a justifiable restraint on
Reeves’s right — a search, but a reasonable search under section 8. As a
reasonable search must be authorized by law,82 he proposed locating the
authority of the State in the common law ancillary powers doctrine under
R. v. Waterfield.83
Applying Waterfield involves assessing whether (1) the police
conduct was aimed at an important police duty (such as protecting life,
preventing crime, or “keeping the peace”); (2) the interference with the
individual’s liberty was necessary to fulfil that duty; and (3) the
interference was on balance proportional.84 Where the conduct fulfils this
standard it will be justified as a lawful exercise of police power under the
common law, even in the absence of explicit legislative or judicial
authority for the conduct. The structure of the Waterfield test, notably,
mirrors the proportionality analysis under section 1 of the Charter:
assessing rational connection, minimal impairment, and overall
this analysis as it has no affect on the nature of one’s vertical right (to privacy) vis-à-vis the state. In
any event, there remains, in a sense, a concern with competing rights that need to be balanced
proportionately; they just are not the rights that first appeared to be at issue.
81
Id., at paras. 71, 74-75 (Moldaver J., concurring).
82
See note 18 and accompanying text.
83
[1963] 3 All E.R. 659 (Crt. Crim. App.) [hereinafter “Waterfield”].
84
See R. v. Reeves, [2018] S.C.J. No. 56, 2018 SCC 56, at para. 78 (S.C.C.) (Moldaver J.,
concurring), citing R. v. MacDonald, [2014] S.C.J. No. 3, 2014 SCC 3, at paras. 34-37 (S.C.C.).
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proportionality. On the basis of the Waterfield test, Moldaver J.
concluded that in the context of an invitation by a co-habitant into a
home, a representative of the State might be justified in entering a joint
home despite the interference with the rights of the other inhabitants.
While Moldaver J. does refer to the privacy interests of co-habitants
like Gravelle,85 what ultimately justifies the infringement of a right under
the Waterfield test is a “police duty” rather than the (vertical) constitutional
rights of another. And if we read Moldaver J.’s analysis carefully, we can
see how it is a concern with the way in which police duties secure the
horizontal autonomy of a consenting co-habitant (like Gravelle) that
informs his reasoning. Securing the horizontal rights of the consenting
resident (and others) from other private persons seems closely connected
to the specific police duties he identifies as relevant here (crime
prevention, apprehending criminals, and assisting victims of crimes),
especially the duty to support potential victims of crime.86 Moreover, he
defines the conduct in need of justification narrowly — asking when/if the
police will be justified in “entering into a shared residence when invited to
take a witness statement in connection with a criminal investigation”. It is
in this specific context that Moldaver J. considers how we might account
for the ability of a co-habitant to invite the State in.87
85
See, e.g., R. v. Reeves, [2018] S.C.J. No. 56, 2018 SCC 56, at paras. 82-84 (S.C.C.)
(Moldaver J., concurring).
86
Id., at para. 79 (Moldaver J., concurring).
87
Id. (Moldaver J., concurring) (emphasis added). Notably, in the background of Moldaver
J.’s analysis seems to be a concern with the privacy rights of the consenting co-habitant. In assessing
the necessity of the conduct, Moldaver J. considers the reasons why it might be essential to allow the
state to enter on the consent of a single resident in ways that reflect a focus on the privacy rights and
autonomy of that resident (e.g., that a witness or victim of crime “may well refuse to [talk to the
police] outside the privacy of their homes” due to fear or other reasons; or may be unable to leave
the home; or be too far from a police station): Id., at paras. 82-84 (Moldaver J., concurring). This
focus is likewise evident in his discussion of whether the importance of the police conduct is on
balance proportionate with the interference with the accused’s own privacy rights in the home. In
considering this aspect of the test, Moldaver J. outlines several factors that should constrain the
proposed police power in a manner which aims to balance the accused’s privacy and the consenting
resident’s privacy and autonomy. These include: (1) assessing whether interviewing the person in
her home is necessary (i.e., whether the resident prefers doing so); (2) limiting the entry to the
purpose of taking a statement; (3) limiting entry to common areas of the home; (4) requiring that the
consenting resident has “authority to consent” to entry (i.e., possesses her own reasonable
expectation of privacy in the space) and that her consent is informed and voluntary as necessary to
waive her own s. 8 rights; and (5) the entry would be limited in duration as required for the
statement. Id., at para. 88 (S.C.C.) (Moldaver J., concurring). However, insofar as he justifies such
entrance exclusively in the context of a police investigation, it is clear that what is at issue is the
need to balance the vertical privacy rights of the accused with the ability of the legal system to
secure the horizontal rights of others (including the consenting co-habitant).
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Thus, despite the suggestion by the Crown, Côté, and Karakatsanis
that the case of Reeves concerned overlapping (vertical) privacy rights,
there is a reading of Moldaver J.’s reasons that suggests that we might
view Reeves as a case about a different sort of competing rights: a
balance between vertical and horizontal rights.88 In either case, as Part IV
suggests, the resolution remains the same: such conflicts ought to be
resolved through a structure of proportionality.
And as the theory of proportionality described in Part IV would call
for, Moldaver J.’s analysis seeks an outcome that resolves the conflict of
rights in a manner that is most consistent with respect for the rights of all
persons to equal autonomy and dignity. His proposed balance seeks to
infringe the accused’s privacy right only insofar as is necessary for the
investigation (as Thorburn would put the point, “to further the course of
justice, which is itself required in order to secure all other rights”89) and
to respect the autonomy of a co-resident in furthering the course of
justice by providing a statement to the police.
It is worth noting that section 8 is peculiar in terms of the many ways
in which we might engage in proportionality analysis to consider whether
a limitation of the underlying right might be justified (in the case of
balancing either horizontal or vertical rights). Proportionality analysis
could of course take place at the level of section 1, as with any Charter
right. In addition, as a consequence of history, section 8 has its own right
and limitation structure. The right developed under the common law to
permit “reasonable” searches and seizures, and thus in considering what
counts as a reasonable limitation, the analysis takes place internal to
section 8 itself.90 Due to the existence of this internal threshold,
violations of section 8 (unreasonable searches) are seldom saved under

88
For another application of Waterfield where this balance between vertical and horizontal
autonomy is more explicit, see R. v. Godoy, [1999] S.C.J. No. 85, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 311, at paras. 13-23
(S.C.C.) (discussing, in the context of a police entrance in response to a 911 call, how autonomy
underpins both the privacy right of the accused and protection of the life and limb of potential
victims under the law).
89
Malcolm Thorburn, “Proportionality” in David Dyzenhaus & Malcolm Thorburn, eds.,
Philosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 306,
at 321.
90
See Thorburn, “Proportionality”, id., at 321 (noting, proportionality reasoning “is
precisely what was at stake in the common law reasoning that gave rise to the recognition of rights
against unreasonable search and seizure, cruel and unusual punishment, excessive bail, and so on.
Common law courts had to determine when it was necessary and proportionate for the state to
interfere with an Englishman’s privacy”).
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section 1 (as a justified limit on rights).91 And, indeed, scholars such as
Austin have suggested that the section 8 reasonableness analysis should
more directly and transparently engage with the proportionality factors of
the Oakes test.92 Furthermore, as Moldaver J.’s concurring judgment in
Reeves demonstrates, courts might also engage in a form proportionality
analysis under the assessment of the Waterfield test. Finally, as cases like
R. v. N.S. indicate, as discussed above, the Court has previously engaged
in more holistic proportionality analysis in balancing between directly
conflicting rights claims.93
The existence of multiple platforms available for this balancing are,
as mentioned above, effectively a historical accident; thus, the analysis I
offer here is somewhat agnostic as to which should serve as the ideal site
of the proportionality analysis. However, some of these tests may be a
better fit than others.94 What is important, I suggest, is that we should
view “overlapping rights” claims as competing rights claims, and that
competing rights claims (either between two vertical rights or between
horizontal and vertical rights) are best adjudicated through a structure of
proportionality. The rights of one person should not affect how we
interpret the rights of others; they may, however, constitute reasons for
justifiably limiting the rights of others.

VI. CONCLUSION
The Crown, Côté J., and Karakatsanis J. suggest that the case of
Reeves raises a question of how we should adjudicate claims of
overlapping Charter rights, where the manner that co-rights holders
91
See, e.g., Hunter v. Southam Inc., (sub nom. Canada (Combines Investigation Acts,
Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc.) [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145,
at 169-70 (S.C.C.); Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 61,
[2002] 3 S.C.R. 209, at para. 46 (S.C.C.); Baron v. Canada, [1993] S.C.J. No. 6, [1993] 1 S.C.R.
416, at 453 (S.C.C.).
92
Lisa Austin, “Information Sharing and ‘Reasonable’ Ambiguities of Section 8 of the
Charter”, (Special Issue, Spring 2007) 57 Univ. of Toronto L.J. 499, at 520.
93
R. v. N.S., [2012] S.C.J. No. 72, 2012 SCC 72 (S.C.C.). See also, note 74 and
accompanying text.
94
On the one hand, it could be argued that the Waterfield test’s focus on police duties may
give insufficient credence to the concern with the respect for the privacy rights of a consenting coresident that Côté and Karakatsanis JJ. identified. However, on the other, it might be a better way of
accounting for the horizontal rights of others (see notes 79-87 and accompanying text). A further
consideration may be that assessing proportionality under s. 8 (versus s. 1) demands that the
claimant prove that the state conduct is disproportionate, while s. 1 places the burden of proof on the
state.
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choose to exercise their rights pull in opposite directions. While such
claims have been most common in the context of section 8,95 the
phenomenon is not limited to this right. As I noted at the outset, Charter
rights protect a wide swath of conduct that we engage in in collaboration
with others. And we could imagine a similar paradigm to that which has
emerged in the context of section 8 playing out across these other areas
of Charter protection, in which one party consents to state conduct that
would otherwise violate the right, contrary to the choice of the other
rights holders.96
Returning to the examples with which I began, we could imagine, for
instance, a situation where one author consented to state censorship
imposed for national security reasons which her co-author resisted;97 a
resident of a municipal public housing unit consenting to restrictions
against displaying religious paraphernalia on an apartment balcony that
other members of the family did not accept;98 and an accused who
waives her right to a speedy trial where her co-accused does not.99 As
with Reeves, it may seem unclear how to approach the adjudication of
claims arising out of these cases when we conceive of these rights as
overlapping or collective entitlements. Can the state stand on the waiver
of one rights holder when faced with a Charter challenge by the other?
Or, alternatively, would it undermine the exercise of the right by the
consenting party if we were to disregard the way they choose to exercise
their right altogether?
In this article I have explained how we ought to approach such
situations of overlapping rights (though I have also noted that, ultimately,
Reeves itself might best be viewed as involving something different
altogether — specifically, a conflict of vertical and horizontal rights).
I have suggested that we should view such contexts not as overlapping
95

See note 41 and accompanying text (surveying the provincial appellate courts that
addressed similar situations under s. 8).
96
On the ways in which waiver of a right may or may not represent an exercise of that right
see note 63.
97
One could imagine, for instance, that Charter implications might arise in a case like
Buzzanga and Durocher if it were to arise today. Cf Regina v. Buzzanga and Durocher, [1979] O.J.
No. 4345, 25 O.R. (2d) 705 (Ont. C.A.).
98
Cf Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] S.C.J. No. 46, 2004 SCC 47 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Amselem”]. On the question of whether freedom of religion can be waived, see
Amselem, id., at paras. 92-93.
99
R. v. Gopie, [2017] O.J. No. 4963, 2017 ONCA 728 (Ont. C.A.) (addressing the
challenges of R. v. Jordan, [2016] S.C.J. No. 27, 2016 SCC 27 (S.C.C.), in the context of multiple
party trials). An accused, could of course seek severance of the trial, but the conceptual question
remains: see Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 591.
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rights, but as competing or conflicting rights. When recast in this light,
this directs us to our ordinary method of mediating among competing
constitutional rights: through proportionality. The precise method of
adjudicating such cases might vary by context, as evidenced by the
various approaches taken in R. v. N.S., Mills, Reeves, and others.
However, the basic idea remains the same: the exercise of the rights of
others may act as a justifiable limitation on how we exercise our right,
but they cannot affect the way that right is itself interpreted or applied.
Moreover, as I have argued, this way of understanding the problem and
approaching the solution fits with compelling accounts of what justifies
the state’s exercise of public authority and the role constitutional rights
play in demarcating the limits of that authority.

